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OPENING EXERCISES.
The opening exercises of the school year
1899-1900 of the Dickinson School of Law
were held in the large lecture room at 3 p.
In., Wednesday, October 4th.

Of the faculty there were present Dr.
Reed, President of the Board of Incorporators; Dr. Trickett, Dean ofthe School;
Major Pllcher, U. S. A.; Judge Sadler,
Prof. Woodward, Prof. S. B. Sadler and
Prof. Mills. Dr. Prince, of the CollegeFaculty, and Mrs. Reed were also present.
There were about fifty new men present.
Nearly all of the middle class have returned and were there, besides the Seniors
and a number of last year graduates who
intend taking a third year.
Dr. Reed was the first speaker. Hegave
an address of welcome and advice. Economy of time, the merits of the Faculty
and School, and the desirability of virtue
he dwelt upon particularly. In speaking
of the economy of time he referred to the
abundant leisure of the student, to the
misuse, or lack of use, to which it is usually
put, and finally to the surprising and
really great results obtainable from an hour
of daily reading during otherwise wasted
time. He spoke in the highest terms of
the Law Faculty, individually and collectively, especially referring to our Dean
as a proof of the rule, "The man who gets
ahead in the worldis usually the man who
is willing to work an hour or two longer a

day than the rest of men." Next he exhorted the men to watch their reputations and be respectable. Then, in conclusion, he extended to all a hearty welcome in the name of the whole College
settlement.
Dr. Trickett was the next speaker. He
confined himself to an explanation of the
schedule, which was written on the blackboard. He then introduced Major Pilcher,
U. S. A., who will, during the coming
year, give a new course, one on medical
jurisprudence, to the Seniors.
Major Pllcher, in a few well chosen remarks, briefly outlined the scheme of the
course and its value to the lawyer.
The Dean next called upon Dr. Prince,
of the College Faculty. After afew clever
pleasantries the Doctor concluded with a
strong plea to the would-be lawyer to be a
man above all else.
The remaining members of the Law
School Faculty announced the time of the
first class meetings in their courses, and
assigned reading in the text books.
The different speeches were freely sprinkled'with wit, which met with much appreciation and applause. The speakers
were greeted in a most enthusiastic fashion. On the whole, the school year may
be said to have started with an enjoyable
amount of energy and good feeling.
The meeting was dismissed with a few
further words of encouragement and good
wishes by Dr. Reed.
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MAJOR P1LCHER.
This school year opens with another addition to the faculty of the Law School.
Major James E. Pilcher, U. S. A., will,
during the coming year, give a course on
Medical Jurisprudence. That he is most
amply qualified will appear in the reading
of the following brief sketch of his career.
Major Pilcher graduated from the Michigan University at'Ann Arbor in the class
of 1879. By extra work, he was granted a
degree six months in advance of the graduation of his class, and left immediately
for a course of study in the Long Island
Hospital, and was afterward made an assistant in that institution. Six months
after leaving that college, he became associated with an older brother and Dr.
George R. Fowler in the establishment
and editorship of the "Annals of Anatomy
and Surgery," the first journal in the English language devoted to surgery and its
unatomical phases. Hecontinuedits managing editor till 1883, when he left to join
the medical department of the army.
After he entered the army he continued
his literary work for four years, he was an
editorial contributor to one of the large
New York weeklies, and also retained editorial connection with "The Annals of
Surgery,:' the successor to the journal
which he was instrumental in founding in
earlier years. With the developing of
the science of nursing soldiers, he became
much interested in the subject of first aid
to the wounded. An article treating this
subject, under the title of "A New Field
of Honor," in Scribner's Magazine in 1889,
attracted considerable attention and led
to a proposition for the preparation of a
book on the subject. This work appeared
in its first edition in 1892, under the title
of "First Aid in Illness and Injury.II It
has passed through three editions in this
country and one in England, and has just
been issued in a fourth edition in this
country, since the beginning of the present
war. It is probably the widest known
treatise on the subject in the world.
His work was not confined* to literary
occupation, however, for in 1896 he was
elected to the professorship of military surgery in Ohio Medical University, at Columbus, and he also held the chair of

military hygiene in Starling Medical College, in the same city. He was the medical officer at the Columbus barracks during this period, which is one of the largest
permanent encampments of the army.
Late in 1879 he was assigned to duty at
Fort Crooke, near Omaha, and as be was
leaving for his new post of duty, he was
paid the high compliment of an election
as professor emeritus in the institution,
which he was leaving, and was, at the
same time, elected professor of military
surgery at Creighton University at Omaha.
He had finished the last lecture of his
course at this college three days before he
left for the war.
Major Pilcher comes to us from Savannah, Georgia, where he was in charge of
the principal medical depot of the U. S.
army during its recent campaigns in Cuba
and Porto Rico. The value of the drugs
and hospital supplies under his care was
$1,000,000.
As a result of severe service and exposure in the Garza revolution on the Mexican frontier in 1899, Major Pilcher acquired a serious and painful affection
which has kept him in a precarious condition from that time until the last summer, when it was considered necessary for
him to relinquish active service, and he is
now on the retired list of the army.
The condition of his health limits both
his capacity and his inclination for work;
but, in addition to the course he gives in
the Law School, he is also doing some instructing in the medical preparatory department of the College.

DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The Dickinson Literary Society held its
first meeting of the year on Tuesday, Oct.
10. President Henderson called the meeting to order and delivered an opening address, welcoming the new students and
promising a year of vigorous and profitable
work. A case was tried, Mr. A. F. John,
of the senior class, sitting as judge. Mr.
Mearkle gave an interesting and amusing
recitation which met with much applause.
Perfect harmony prevails, and there is
every prospect for a successful and prosperous year for the society.
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THE SCHOOL.
The following is the arrangement of lectures for this term
MONDAY

JUNIOR
CLASS

MIDDLE

CLASS

WEDNESDAY

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

Real Prop. 8.30
Crim. Law 1.30

Real Prop. 9.30
Torts 1.30

Contracts 9.30
Crim. Law 1.30

Contracts 10.30
Torts 1.30

Anal. of cases 8.30
Crim. Law 1.30
Blackstone 2.30

Executors 10
Sales 11.30

Executors 8.30
Equity 2.30

Evidence 10.30
Sales 11.30

Evidence 9.30
Equity 2.30

Evidence 10
Sales 11.30

Executors 8.30
Partnership 1.30

Corporations 8.30
Quasi Cont. 10.30

Corporations8.30
Partnership 1.30

Corporations 8.30
Quasi Cont. 10

SENIOR I Executors 10
Medical Jurispru-

CLASS

TUESDAY

dence 2.30

Practice 2.30

Practice 2.30

On Friday, October 13th, the Middle
Class held an election of class officers for
the coming year. Mr. Lorrie Holcomb
was elected President. The other officers
elected were: Vice President, Mr. A. W.
Mitchell ; Secretary, ir. Shipman; Treasurer, Mr. O'Keefe.
At the same meeting a communication
laying out the plan of the Microcosm
Board of the College for Law School cooperation was read to the class. The principal features of this plan are: One-fourth
of the book to be given to the Law School ;
one-fourth of the losses or gains to go to
the Law School; two men, one the chief
literary editor of the department, the other
the chief business editor, to be elected by
the class to meet with the .Microcosm
Board of the College in their deliberations ;
each of these elected editors to select two
assistants. Mr. Lentz had already been
elected as literary editor and this election the Board ratified. Mr. Winlack was
elected as business editor. The plan of
the College Board seemed to meet with
very general approval.
Prominent on this year's "Varsity"
football team are McGuffey, Clippinger,
Ralston and Lowther, all of the Law
School, and all brilliant players.
Much of the success of this year's team
may fairly be said to be due to Rothermel's handling of the second eleven. He
manages to instil an amount of spirit and
"devil" into them which goes far to compensate for their light weight.
On the second team the following men
from the Law School are at present play-

Blackstone

ing: Kostenbader, Gillespie, Hess, Lauer,
Rhodes, Duble and Nichols.
The prospects of the team are exceptionally bright, and we look forward confidently to a highly successful season.
ALUMNI NOTES.
The following article, clipped from the
Keystone Gazette, of Bellefonte, will be of
interest to '96 men, of whom Mr. Walker
is one. The comment is on an address delivered by him last Decoration Day:
"W. Harrison Walker, Esq., of Bellefonte, was the orator of the occasion.
His address Was highly acceptable and
abounded in pathos and interest. His
glowing tributes to the soldier of '61-'65,
and to those in the service of our country
in the present conflict, especially to our
gallant Centre County boys, were beautiful
beyond description.
Mr. Walker is but a young man in his
profession; one in whom Centre County
can well take pride, and we bespeak for
him a brilliant career."
Mr. H. C. Hubler, of last year's class,
has been in the office of W. H. M. Oram,
in Shamokin, since last July. Heis studying to take the Bar examination in the
Spring.
Mr. Garrett B. Stevens, '99, who made
a visit to Carlisle recently, reports the continued success and exceptional prospects
of Messrs. Leidy, Kantner, Fisher hnd
Price, four graduates of recent years who
are practicing at the Berks County Bar.
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Mr. Win. A. Jordan, of last year's class,
is studying in the office of Thomas Patterson, in Pittsburgh. He will take the Allegheny County examinations in the Spring.
Mr. Gabriel H. Moyer has been admitted
to and is practicing at the Luzerne County
Bar.

4. Make a trial brief.
5. See all your witnesses before the trial.
6. Do not cross-examine too much.
7. Be vigilant.
The following students have been elected
to membership: Messrs. Lauer, Louther,
MeDuffey, Adamson, Graul, Duble, Edwardson and Nichols.

Mr. R. R. Vale, '99, has been admitted
to the Philadelphia Bar. He has his office
in the Hale Building.

MOOT COURT.

From all parts of the State come reports
of the increasing difficulty of the examinations for admission to the various Bars.
One of the most striking of the instances
which have recently come to our attention
comes from Northumberland County.
There were twenty-three applicants for
examinati6n, and of these only two passed
unconditionally in the subjects on which
they were questioned.

THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
The Allison Society has started this
year's work under the most favorable circumstances.
Harmony prevails among
its members, and all are working together
for the good of the society and hence for
the good of each other. Certainly if the
advantaqes of a literary society are to be
realized the members must have meetings
regularly and must take as much active
interest as they do in class work. The
members fully understand this and are
governed accordingly. At the first regular
meeting President Rothermel extended a
hearty welcome to the incoming members
of the school. Short addresses by the returning students followed. Prof. Sadler
presided as judge while the merits of a
case were argued.
At the second regular meeting Prof.
Woodward gave a lecture on "Practical
Hints to Young Attorneys."
The lecture
was highly instructive and entertaining
and was just as highly appreciated by
those present. The following are some of
the principal points made:
I. Do not advise your prospective client
until you are sure of the law.
2. Exact a retainer.
3. Be prompt and use tact in getting
affidavits.

HENRY PEABODY vs. SIMON
HAWKES.
Father liable for necessariesfurnished to
infant son.

and KERN for plaintiff.
A parent is bound to provide his children with necessaries.-Fitler v. Fitler, 33
Pa. 50; Strong v. Foote, 42 Conn. 203;
VanValkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns,
480. Medical attendance is a necessary.
FRANK and LAVENS for defendant.
Father is not liable for contracts of son
unless son is acting as express agent of
father.-Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J.
L., 383 ; Holt v. Baldwin, 46 Mo., 265.
SHEAFEER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Peabody, a dentist, at the request of a
son of Hawkes, nineteen years old, suffering with toothache, fixed his tooth. The
son told plaintiffto charge his father. The
son died nine months afterwards, but twice
before his death Peabody sent a bill to
Hawkes; once by letter, properly addressed, postage paid, with printed request
on corner of envelope to return to Peabody
if not called for in five days. It was not
returned. Defendant asks court to say
that from these facts there is no sufficient
evidence to support a recovery of the five
dollars claimed.
OPINION OF COURT.

The plaintiffs cause of action is based
on the assumption that a parent is bound
to support his minor children. Morally
this is, of course, true. But whether this
is a legal obligation or whether it is merely
a natural duty, binding in morals only is
a question on which the authorities are
conflicting. In England and in some of
our states it is held that it is merely a
moral obligation and does not make a
parent legally liable to pay his child's
debts. But the general holding of the
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American cases is that the parent can be
held liable for necessaries furnished to his
infant child, 17 Am. and Eng. Ency. of
Law, 351.
This seems to be the accepted doctrine
in Pennsylvania. Maynard v. McKinn,
2 Forum, 90 ; Guthrie v. Murphy, 4 Watts,
80. In Fitler v. Fitler, 33 Pa. 54, the lower
court through Woodward, J., says: "There
is no duty more clear and imperative than
that of a father to support his children
during minority. And though we have
no statute enforcing it, except in the case
or pauperism, I hold it to be a legal obligation. He is absolutely bound to provide
reasonably for their maintenance and education, even though they have no property
of their own, and if he neglect this duty,
he may be sued for necessaries furnished,
and schooling given, underjust and reasonable circumstances." The supreme court
sustained his decision.
It became pertinent to this case to define
the term "necessaries."
It is not invariably used in its strictest sense, nor is it
limited to that which is necessary to sustain life, but includes whatever is prnper
and suitable in the case of each individual,
having regard to his circumstances and
condition in life. That the services of a
dentist are included under this term cannot be seriously doubted. Strong v. Foote,
42 Conn. 203.
But it is contended by the defendants
that even if it should be decided to be a
necessary, the child itself and not the
parent should be held liable, as it has not
been shown that there has been a palpable
neglect of duty or an express or implied
authority on the part- of the father. In
the case at bar we must assume that the
ordinary family relations existed. That
the father had the custody, the society and
services of the child. Such circumstances
are sufficient to lead an ordinarily prudent
man to believe that the son came with the
authority of the father to have the tooth
fixed. The courts are so zealous to enforce
the obligations of a parent that very slight
circumstances will justify a jury in finding
the authority of the child to bind the
parent for necessaries.
In Parker v.
Tillinghast, 19 Abb. N. Cas. 190, a father
sent a son away to school with a wardrobe
consisting of a very light overcoat, and
some other clothes which the son had

outgrown, and this was held sufficient to
hold the father liable for the new clothes
ordered by the son.
In the case at bar Peabody twice sent a
bill to Hawkes, once by letter, properly
addressed, postage prepaid, with printed
request on the corner of envelope to return
to Peabody, if not called for in five days.
It is well settled that the fact of depositing
in the post-office a properly addressed,
prepaid letter, raises a natural presumption, founded in common experience, that
it has reached its destination by due course
of mail. In other words it is prima facie
evidence that it has been received by the
party to whom it was addressed. In this
case the presumption is strengthened by
the fact that the name and address of the
dentist was stamped on the envelope covering the bill, so that it becomes well nigh
conclusive, Jensen v. McCarkell, 154 Pa.
323; Whitmore v. Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 405;
Folsom v. Cook, 115 Pa. 549. The manifest object of sending these notices was to
give the defendant notice that the work
had been done on his credit, and that he
looked to him for payment.
Hawkes
not having disavowed his liability after
Peabody had sent these notices he naturally supposed that Hawkes considered
himself liable. By this conduct Hawkes
may be presumed to have ratified the
action of his son. Under these circumstances we must refuse the request of the
defendant, and leave the case to the jury.
W. B. FREED, J.
IN TiE SUPERIOR COURT.

The learned court below considered
whether as basis for its decision (1) there
was a quasi-contract, and (2) there was an
express contract. The weight of authorites
is we think against the creation of obligations on parents, in the absence of contract,
by the mere rendition of services to children. There must be circumstances, most
courts hold, to show an authority actually
given by the parent to the child, or legally
to be inferred. 17 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
356. It is not enough that the articles furnished are necessaries, but there must be
an express or implied contract to pay for
them. McMillan v. Lee,78 Ill. 443; Gotts
v. Clark, Id. 229; Shelton v. Springett,
20 E. L. & Eq. 281; Mortimer v. Wright,
6 M. & W. 482; Freeman v. Robinson, 38
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N. J. L. 283. The Pennsylvania cases do
We think it committed no error, in alnot agree with these. If a father neglects lowing the jury to determine whether
to provide necessaries for his son, others
there was a contract. Twice a bill was
are ipso facto authorized by law, on the sent to Hawkes.
The jury properly
request of the son, to supply them at the concluded that he received them, and
expense of the father. Mohney v. Evans,
Hawkes did not deny his obligation. The
51 Pa., 80; Rundel v. Keeler, 7 WV. 237; jury might properly infer that this failure
Johnson v. Lines, 6 W. & S. 80.
to deny, was due to the consciousness that
The things thus furnished without the the son had acted, with his authority, in
direction or request of the father, must be procuring the service. When a charge is
"necessaries."
Medical attendance to the communicated to a man, of such a nature
son, if sick, McMillen v. Lee, 78 II. 443, a
that "according to common experience a
dentist's service in filling decayed teeth,
man would naturally repudiate it, if unStrong v. Foote, 42 Conn. 203, Lamson v.
founded, the fact that it was made and
Varnum, 171 Mass. 237; a plough, 7 W.
not repudiated, may be left to the jury."
237; a pair of bulls, supplied to a son who
Sturtevant v. Wallack, 141 Mass. 119;
was farming, 61 Pa. 80; a hat or coat, 7 W.
Thayer v. White, 12 Metc. 343; Bailey v.
237, might be necessaries. But, in deter- King, 41 Conn. 365; Lamson v. Varnum,
mining whether they are, the possession
171 Mass. 237; McClenkan v. McMillan, 6
by the son, ofsimilar articles would deserve
Pa. 366.
consideration. For a boy that already has
The opinion of the learned court below,
threeor four coats, another would hardly in over-ruling the motion for a non-suit,
be a necessary. Johnson v. Lines, 6 W.
sufficiently vindicates the submission of
& S. 80. If the father had already employ- the case to the jury.
ed dentist A to fill the teeth ofhisson, the
Judgment affirmed.
service of dentist B would not be a necessary.
If a father is willing to obtain
WERTZ vs. H. CLAY FRICK COKE
clothes for his son from merchant X, and
COMPANY.
not from merchant Y, it would scarcely be
supposed that Y could supply them, withWa9te-water- Upper landlord may not
out the father's consent, and compel him
discharge water upon lands of lower
landlord ifpossible otherwise to dispose
to pay for them. Did Hawkes neglect to
of it at reasonableexpense.
secure the services of any dentist for his
son? Did he simply not permit the son
GERY and HENDERSON for plaintiff.
to consult the plaintiff? The facts are not
ALEXANDER and BOLTE for defendant.
enough to justify a jury in finding the
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
plaintifrs service a necessary. Five dollars
for the "fixing' of a tooth, is a large outSome time in 1892 Mr. Martin Wertz
lay for a man who earns only five dollars
conveyed to the H. Clay Frick Coke Coma week on the average or less. Many
pany all the coal underlying his farm,
large classes of society find other things so
"Together with all and singular the minmuch more necessary than dentist's ser- ing rights, and privileges, and the right to
vices, that they dispense with these altomanufacture coal and coke without liabilgether. What was the financial condition
ity for damages by reason of the manufacofthe defendant? He surely was not bound
ture of said coal and other coal into coke
to spend five dollars on his son's tooth, at
at works of second party wherever located
the expense of the stomachs of the rest of
outside of the premises of said first party,
the family. Were the evidence sufficient,
and including the right in and to the said
thejury would say whether the work of the party of the second part, its successors and
plaintiff was a necessary. They cannotbe
assigns, of mining and taking away all the
permitted to say so, when it is insufficient.
coal aforesaid, underlying the said tract of
51 Pa. 80, 7 W. 237. We understand that
land, (except as hereinbefore excepted and
the learned trial court declined to allow
reserved) without liability to the parties of
thejury to find a verdict for the plaintiff,
the first part, their successors and assigns,
on the mere ground that the dental work
for damage done to the surface or the spring
was uvccssary; that is o)n a quasi-contract.
or water courses, and without being re-
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-quired to support the said surface, and all
necessary rights of way under said surface
to make and maintain passage ways, tracks
and roads for the purpose of mining, transporting and conveying said coal and of
transporting and conveying the coal from
adjacent and other lands, or supplies in
and over said passage ways, tracks and
ways forever; together with all reasonable
privileges for ventilating, pumping and
draining the mines.
It is hereby expressly understood that
no surface privileges are hereby given, except for ventilation and water shaft, and
all water pumped from the mines to the
surface shall be conducted by said second
party, its successors or assigns, to the nearest natural water outlet in pipes laid two
feet under ground, and all debris or waste
from the air or from the water shafts to be
deposited by second party, its successors
or assigns, at the nearest available point
so as to do the least possible damage to surface of said second party."
About one year ago the H. Clay Frick
Coke Company put down a hole about fifty
yards from the corner of Mr. Wertz's farm
from which to pump the water collecting
in that part of the mine. The hole is
drilled almost at the top of a small elevation, yet the surface water from around
the hole drains toward the Wertz's farm.
The company cut a large channel through
the top of this elevation and laid a large
pipe in which they carry the sulphur water
almost directly away from the Wertz
farm.
Something got wrong with the pipe last
fall and they asked Mr. Wertz to allow
them to run the water down overhis fields
until they made the necessary repairs.
Mr. Wertz allowed them to so run the
water for a reasonable time to make the
repairs. They now refuse to turn the water
off Mr. Wertz's farm. They never attempted to make any repairs. There is no
natural water outlet through the Wertz
farm where the company is running the
water; nothing but a furrow drawn
through the field to carry off the surface
water.
There is very little if any coal taken out
from under the Wertz farm, but they are
working very close to the line.
Mr. Wertz brings an action of trespass.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

In the view which we take of this case,
the contents of the deed to the H. Clay
Frick Coke Co. have no relevancy. The
act complained of does not pertain to the
surface privileges referred to in that instrument. The water running over Wertz's
fields is brought to the surface at an elevated point beyond the Wertz farm and is
not even pumped from beneath the same
as "very little if any" coal has been removed from under said farm.
The license which the H. Clay Frick
Coke Co. had, was "a bare license unaccompanied with any expenditure on the
part of the grantee. In such a case it is
at any, and at all times revocable. Huff
v. McCauley, 53 Pa. 206.
Wertz commanded the defendants to
turn the water off his land. This was a
distinct revocation of the parol license.
The H. Clay Frick Coke Co. refused to
comply with the demands of the plaintiff
and thus clearly made themselves trespassers from the date of the revocation of
the license, unless the defendants have a
legal right, regardless of a license or any
other authority from Wertz, to bring this
accumulated water from their mines and
allow it to escape in whatever direction
the inclination of the surface may indicate.
Have the defendants, a mining company,
this legal right?
In Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa.
146, Clark, J., said, "It may be stated as a
general proposition, that every man has the
right to the natural use and enjoyment of
his own property, and if whilst lawfully in
such use and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss occurs to his neighbor, it is damnum absque injuria. Nor do we say, that
a miner, in order that his mines may be
made available, may enter upon his
neighbor's lands, or inflict upon him any
other immediate or direct injury, but we
do say that in the operation of mining, in
the ordinary and usual manner, he may
upon his own lands, lead the water which
percolates into his mine, into the stream
which forms the natural drainage of the
basin in which the coal is situate, although
the quantity as well as the quality of the
water in the stream is thereby affected."
But the rule in Sanderson's case does
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not exempt mining companies from all liability in connection with the discharge
of the water from their mines. The rule
in that case is exceptional and does not go
beyond (1) the ordinary and usual manner
of use, (2) necessary and unavoidable
damage, and (3) drainage over one's own
land into the stream which forms the
natural outlet for the waters of the basin
in which the mine is located.
The case at bar differs from the Sanderson case in the second and third particulars
and therefore does not come within that.
special rule. The damage done to Wertz's
land is unnecessary and avoidable. It
does not appear that the defect in the pipes
is irreparable, nor that that method of disposing of the water was unsatisfactory,
ineffective or excessively expensive. On
the other hand it is shown that these
pipes did carry the water off without damage to Wertz prior to fheir becoming defective. Nor is the water being conducted
over the H. Frick Coke Company's own
land to a natural water-course as in the
Sanderson case.
" It is not to be lost sight of that the defendant's right to injure another's land at
all, to any extent, is an exception, and the
burden is always upon him to bring himself within it. And his exception is
founded on necessity, and because otherwise he would himself be deprived of the
beneficial use and enjoyment of his own
land. * * - If the expense of preventing
the damage from his act is such as practically to counterbalance the expected profit
or benefits, then it is clearly unreasonable,
and beyond what he could be justly called
upon to assume. If on the other hand,
however large in actual amount, it is
small in proportion to the gain to himself,
it is reasonable in regard to his neighbor's
rights, and he should pay it to prevent
the damage, or should make compensation
for the injury done. * * Where conflict is irreconcilable the right to use one's
own must prevail, but it can only do so
without compensation where the resulting
damage is not avoidable at all, or only at
such expense as would be practically prohibitory." Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 274.
In our opinion the expense which might
have been incurred by defendants in avoiding the damage to Wertz's fields would not
have been unreasonable or prohibitory.

The maxim, "Sic utere tuo ut alicnum
non laedas," should be applied to this
case.
Mitchell, J., in Collins v. Chartiers, 131
Pa., 156, remarks that "the dividing line
between the right to use one's own and the
duty not to injure another is one of great
nicety and importance and frequently of
difficulty."
After a deliberate consideration of the
facts in this case and the decisions in Pennsylvania which have any relevancy to the
issue we are of the opinion that this action
lies.
The motion for a non-suit is denied.
LONG, P. J.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The H. Clay Frick Co. has pumped up
the water from its mine to the surface,
about fifty yards from the surface of
Wertz's farm and poured it out so that by
gravitation it flows across the fifty yards
and upon the land of Wertz. Has it a
right to doso?
The coal under Wertz's farm has been
conveyed by him, but the mining in connection with which the water has been
pumped, has not been of this coal, but of
coal on an adjacent tract. Wertz's deed
exempts the company from liability for
damages by reason of the manufacture of
coke from the coal thus sold. or from any
other coal. It also authorizes the company to maintain passageways for the
purpose of mining and transporting coal,
and grants to it "Iall reasonable privileges
for ventilating, pumping and draining the
mines." Neither the language of the deed
alone, nor the language in conjunction
with the circumstances, justifies the inference that the privileges for pumping and
draining, thus conferred, referred to pumping from and draining of other mines than
those of the coal granted.
When the company opened the hole for
pumping, it made a somewhat elaborate
provision for conducting the water, not to
and upon Wertz's farm, but away from it.
This conduct has some significance, as indicating the interpretation put by the
company upon the contract. When"something got wrong with the pipe," the company not assuming that it had a right
under the deed, to let the water flow over
the Wertz farm, applied to him forpermis-
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sion thus to let it flow, until it should
make the necessary repairs. The jury
would be warranted in believing that the
company had no right, in consequence of
its deed, to overflow the plaintiff's land.
The permission was given for a short time.
That time has expired, and Wertz has requested the company to cease to allow the
drainage to overflow his land. Each succeeding act of flowage since this request,
is a trespass, unless there is some justification for it, independent of the deed and
the oral permission.
The company's land at tile point at
which the water is raised to the surface is
higher than Wertz's. The owner of the
superior land has a right that the water
falling upon it naturally, should flow, by
natural channels, upon the inferior.
Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407; Martin
v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 215. Should the owner
of the inferior prevent the access of the
water in this way to his land, he will be
responsible in damages. Glass v. Fritz, 148
Pa. 324. On the other hand, the owner of
the superior land is responsible, if he
causes water to flow from his land in new
channels, upon the land of his neighbors.
Hays v. Hinkleman, 68 Pa. 324; Miller v.
Laubach, 47 Pa. 154; Rhoads v. Davidheiser, 133 Pa. 226; 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
915, 928.
It does not appear that the Frick Company have made new channels, in order to
conduct the water upon the land of Wertz.
It has artificially brought water upon the
surface of its own land and allowed it, by
natural courses, to flow on Wertz's land.
"The right of the upper land-owner to discharge water on the lower* lands of his
neighbor, is in general, a right of flowage
only in the natural ways and natural quantities. If he alters the natural conditions
so as to change the course of the water, or
concentrate it at a particular point, or by
artificialmeans to increase its volume, he
becomes liable for an injury caused thereby." Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 267.
When mining coal, or oil is not reasonably possible, without polluting streams
of water, to the detriment of land Owners
depending on them for a water supply,
such pollution is damnum absqu , injuria
Penna. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126;
Collins v. Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143; 139 Pa. 111.

Probably the same principle applies to flowage on a neighbor's land. If oil cannot be
obtained except by processes which cause
the raising up of salt water, which
unavoidably overflows a neighbor's land,
perhaps the neighbor can maintain no
action. Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 267.
But, the damage, in order to furnish no
cause of action, must be unavoidable. 131
Pa. 143; 139 Pa. 111. If e. g. the salt
water pumped from an oil well, to the surface, can, by means of a comparatively inexpensive ditch, be diverted from the
neighbor's land, he will have an action if,
the means of diversion not being adopted,
his land is overflowed. 165 Pa. 267. If
the expense of arrangements for avoiding
damage to a neighbor, is small, in proportion to the gains of the mining operation,
it should be borne by the mine operator in
order to prevent the damage. Cf. Homer
v. Watson, 79 Pa. 242; Baird v. Williamson, 33 L. J. 101; 1 Add. Torts, 111. The
doctrine of Penna. Coal Co. v. Sanderson,
113 Pa. 126, must be applied with its necessary qualifications. Hindson v. Markle,
171 Pa. 138; Robertson v. Coal Co., 172 Pa.
566; Common v. Russell, 172 Pa. 506.
The evidence shows that the Frick Co.
might easily drain its mine without
overflowing the plaintiffs land.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN QUINN vs. P. R. R. Co.
Negligence-Partycausingfire by cannot
set up recovery from Ins. Company in'
mitigation of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Quinn owned a farm through which the
railroad of defendant passed, within 25
feet of barn. On 13th January, 1898, a
locomotive passing and not provided with
spark arresters, emitted sparks some of
which flew through a window, two panes
of which had been broken for a week, and
falling on hay in the barn lying under the
window, set fire to it and consumed the
barn. The barn and contents worth $2500
were totally destroyed. Quinn obtained
from an insurance company in which the
barn was insured $1700. He claims-to
recover from the railroad company $2500.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
The railroad company was an incorporated company, entitled to the right of
way for its engines, etc., upon the track
as located near the plaintiff's barn. The
company, therefore, if in the proper use of
the road, was in lawful pursuit of a legitimate business and if injury resulted to the
plaintiff it is damnum absque injuria,and
the company is not liable in damages except for negligence. Henderson v. Railroad
Co., 144 Pa. 461; Frankford, etc., Turnpike
Co. v. Railroad Co., 54 Pa. 345; Phil., etc.,
R. Co. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. 182.
The mere existence of fires along the
company's road caused by sparks from the
company's engines is not enough to fasten
upon the company the charge ofnegligence
or want of skill. Phil., etc., R. Co. v.
Yeiser, 8 Pa. 366.
It is the duty, however, of the railroad
company in the use of a locomotive to use
reasonable precaution so as to prevent
damage to the property of others; hence in
Lackawanna, etc., R. Co. v. Dloak, 52 Pa.
379, where although there was no decisive
evidence that the building was fired by
the defendant's engine, emitting sparks
at the time it passed the plaintiff's place,
yet the building being near the tracks and
being discovered to be on fire after the
train had passed and it being also shown
that the engine was not provided with
spark arrester, the court held that the
question of negligence was properly submitted to the jury. The effect of this instruction is to establish the principle
in Pennsylvania that in case of loss by
fire, fairly attributed to sparks from a
railroad company's locomotive engine, the
absence of a spark arrester is primafacie
evidence of negligence on the part of the
railroad company. To prove negligence
in a case like the one under our consideration it is not necessary that the fact be
established by direct or positive proof;
like any other fact it may be established
by circumstantial evidence and any proper
evidence from which negligence may be
inferred is sufficient to throw the burden
upon the defendant. Wharton on Evidence, 811, says a slight presumption of
evidence is sufficient to throw the burden
on defendant. In the zase under our con-

sideration it has been shown that the engine which caused the fire was unprovided
with a spark arrester and therefore the
company is prima facie liable for negligence. Lackawanna, etc., R. Co. v. Doak,
52 Pa. 379.
The defendants have set up that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in leaving the pane of glass out for
a week. In the opinion of the court the
plaintiff acted as on ordinary man would
have done under the circumstances, it
being very unusual for any person to put
in a new pane of glass in a barn as soon as
one is broken, especially on farms.
In regard to the point which the defendants failed to touch, that is, about the insurance money already paid,it appears that
the plaintiffmay recover his insurance and
also reccver from the railroad company. In
doing the latter, however, he became liable
to the insurance company for the amount
paid by them to him.
Therefore gentlemen of the jury you will
find for the plaintiff for the full value of
the barn, $2500.
By the Court.
F. J. LAUBENSTEIN, P. J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

Two questions were presented by the
case in the court below. Was the defendant negligent, and did his negligence cause
the conflagration of the barn? Was the
llaintiff negligent, and did his negligence
contribute to that conflagration ?
The defendant's locomotive had no spark
arrester. Was this per se a negligent
omission of the company? That the jury
might well have inferred that it was, is indisputable. Lackawanna, etc., R. R. v.
Doak, 52 Pa., 379. It is not so clear
whether the court could, as it has, pronounce the omission negligent as matter
of law. We think at this late date that it
might. But, may it be said, as matter of
law, that had there been a spark-arrester,
the sparks which caused the fire, would
not have done so? Were they- large or
small? Were they such as at the time, had
there been an arrester, would not have escaped ? The use of arresters is very general, and yet fires caused by fugacious
sparks are unfortunately not unusual. As
merely from a fire it is not permissible to
infer omissions of duty on the part of the

THE FORUM.
railroad company, Jennings v. R. R.
Co., 93 Pa. 337 ; neither is it, merely from
the absence of an arrester and a fire, permissible for the court to declare that the
fire has been caused by negligence. This,
however, the learned court below has
done.
The defendant urged that Quinn had
been guilty of contributory negligence.
Though his barn stood but twenty-five
feet from the ailroad track, two panes of
a window looking towards the track had
been broken out for a week. It is shown
that the sparks flew through these panes,
and falling on hay lying under the windows, set fire to it. In directing the jury
to find a verdict for the plaintiff, the court
has determined as matter of law, that the
plaintiff was not negligent in suffering the
panes to be out of the window.
There are two or three cases in Pennsylvania which seem to hold that the owner
of land is not bound to anticipate possible
negligence of the railroad company, and
avoid keeping the buildings in such a state
that they might be set fire to by such negligence. This doctrine was propounded in
Phila., etc., R. R. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa.,
182, and Phila., etc., R. R. Co. v. Schultz,
93 Pa., 341. There are, however, cases to
the contrary. Surely the owner may be
careless in the location of a combustible
structure close to a track, or in the use of
materials that increase the risk of fire,
even though such fire should be the product of the carelessness of the company.
The logical application of the rule of the
cases cited, would result in the abrogation
of the principle that contributory negligence of the plaintiff prevents indemnification for the loss caused by the negligence
of the defendant.
In Wild v. Bo.aton and Maine R. R., 171
Mass. 245, the facts were almost identical
with those of the case before us. The
court did not decide that Wild was not
negligent, but allowed the jury to say
whether he was. In Louisville, etc., R.
R. v. Richardson, 66 Ind., 43, the jury returned, by special verdict, that the window of the house, looking towards the
track, wasleft open, that thesparksentered
through it, and set fire to the contents of
the room and to the house, and that the
open window was a cause or condition of
the conflagration. They expressly found

however, that Richardson was not negligent in leaving the window open. Was
it prudent to leave two panes of glass out?
Did Quinn know that they were out?
Ought he to have kept such a watch over
his barn that he would have discovered
that they were out in time to have replaced
them before the fire? These were questions for the jury, and not for the court.
The barn an d contents, worth $2500, were
totally destroyed. The plaintiff had, however, obtained $1700 upon a policy of insurance, and the defendant contends that
it is not liable for more than $800, the
difference between these sums. The court
was correct, in negativing this claim.
One who causes a loss by fire cannot mitigate the damages which he must pay, by
showing that the plaintiff has obtained an
indemnity from an insurance company.
Pa. R. R. v. Page, 21 W. N. C. 52; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 123
Pa. 516; Ins. Co. v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 123
Pa. 523; Etna Ins. Co. v. Confer, 158 Pa.
598; Stoughton v. Gas Co, 165 Pa. 428;
Phila., etc., R. R. v. Hendrickson, 80 Pa.
182. When one is sued for injury to the
person, he cannot diminish the damages
to be recovered, by the amount obtained
on an accident, 2 Wood, Railway Law,
1245; Patterson's Railway Law, 474; or
life policy, by the person injured. N. P.
R. R. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 15. The insurance
company may have a right to be subrogated to the judgment which Quinn recovers,
but this right does not concern the defendant.
As the court has not allowed the jury to
pass on questions which only they can determine, the judgment is reversed, with
a venirefaciasde novo.
JAS. COMPTON vs. IRS. REBECCA
KING.
and STAUFFER for plaintiff.
PIPER and HARPEL for defendant.
LIGHT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Win. King bought a lot in 1896 before his
marriage. The property was improved
and he was then married. On September
2.5, 1896, he contracted for further improvements on the property. On October .12,
1896, he transferred the property by deed
to Fred Tobias who on the same day trans-
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ferred the property for the same consideration to Mrs. Win. King, wife of the
grantor in the conveyance to Fred Tobias.
On October 19, 1896, the contractor delivered the first lumber and proceeded
to make improvements as per contract
made on the 25th day of September, 1896.
Said contract was made in the presence
of both Mr. and Mrs. King. Said contract
was finished and both parties, Mr. and
Mrs. King, refused to pay; the husband
because he is no longer the owner, the
wife, because she did not make the
contract. Judgment before a Justice of
the Peace, January 1, 1897, for amount of
contract against Win. King. Execution
February 1, 1897, returned marked no
goods. Assumpsit against Mrs. King for

$225.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Win. King bought a lot in 1896 before
his marriage. The property was improved
and he was then married. On September
25, 1896, he contracted for further improvements on the property and in the presence
of his wife. On October 12, 1896, the
property was conveyed by deed to his wife
and on October 19, 1896, the contractor delivered the first lumber and proceeded to
make improvements as per contract of
September 25, 1896. The contract was
finished and both King and his wife refused to pay. - Judgment was obtained
January 1, 1897, against King and the execution, February 1, 1897, was returned
marked nulla bona. This suit was then
brought by Compton against Mrs. King
for the amount of the contract.
lrs. King
defends on the ground that she did not
make the contract, and the sole question
is, did she make it or not?
Contracts may be either express or implied. Undoubtedly the defendant in this
suit made no express contract for improvements on the property. However, after
the property was conveyed to her, she had
the sole right to say whether or not the
contractor should go on the lot to improve
it; and, when one week after the conveyance he appeared ready to make improvements and in fact proceeded to make them,
she never raised a word of dissent, but
allowed him to continue them to completion.
The record is silent as to the time consumed in making the improvements, but

it seems a fair inference that the nature of
the improvements about the house would
be such, that the contractor must have
been occupied in the work long enough to
bring the matter clearly to Mrs. King's
knowledge.
If a party voluntarily accepts and avails
himself of valuable services rendered for
his benefit, when he has the option, either
to accept or reject them, even if there is no
distinct proof that they were rendered by
his authority or request, a promise to pay
them may be inferred. His knowledge
that they were valuable and his exercise
of the option to avail himself of them,
justify this inference. fDay v. Caton, 119
Mass. 513. Therefore, when Mrs. King
stood by in silence and saw valuable services rendered upon her real estate by the
improvement of the structure thereon, the
benefits of which she knew would inure
to her, such silence accompanied with the
knowledge that the contractor expected
payment for his services, should be treated
as an acceptance and as an implied promise
to pay for them. In Logan v. Gardner,
136 Pa. 588, the Court said, "Encouragement is necessary where the party is
ignorant; but knowledge creates the duty
to speak, and, where that exists, silence is
enough to estop." So also in Carrv. Wallace, 7 W. 394, and Wahl v. Pittsburgh &
Western Ry., 158 Pa. 257, the Court held
that silence in the face of a duty to speak
estops the defendant in asserting what
would otherwise be his right.
Quite a number of cases might be quoted
to show that where one knowingly reaps
the benefits of another's labor there is an
implied promise to pay for them. The
caseofthe First Baptist Church v. Caughey,
85 Pa. 271, was one in which the trustees
of the church borrowed money for the construction of an edifice where they had no
right to do so, yet the money obtained had
been actually used in the construction, the
church receiving the benefit therefrom,and
plaintiff was permitted to recover. Where
a person took sixty-four refrigerators,
which he claimed he had not bought, out
of the possession of the railroad company,
and had them hauled to his own place of
business, and after having been informed
of the shipment and consignment to him,
sent a check to the sellers for other merchandise purchased of them without any
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reference to the goods in controversy, he
was held liable on the implied assumpsit:
Indiana Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 155 Pa. 160.
A defendant in his affidavit denied that
he had purchased goods charged in the
plaintiff's book account filed, or authorized anyone to purchase for him, but did
not deny the receipt and use of the goods.
The plaintiff asked for a rule for want of
an affidavit of defence and the rule was
made absolute: Reis v. Herman, 1 W. N.
C. 84. See also, Deysher v. Triebel, 64 Pa.
383; Grove v. Barclay, 106 Pa. 155; Graff v.
Callahan, 158 Pa. 380; Snyder v. Steinmetz,
6 Super Ct. 341.
The circumstances of the case at bar
clearly determine the expectation of payment on the part of the plaintiff and the
implied promise on the part of the defendant and judgment is therefore rendered in
favor of the plaintiff in the amount of his
claim.
MCACHRAN, P. J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
On September 2.5, 1896, William King,
owning a house and lot contracted with
Compton to improve the house. Seventeen
days after, viz., October 12, 1896, King
conveyed the house and lot to Rebecca,
his wife. Nothing had yet been done,
under the contract, by Compton.
On
October 19th Compton began and completed the improvements.
The mere contract for improvements,
did not itself become a lien. For work
done or material furnished before the sale
a lien would attach which the sale could
not detach. Act May 18,1887, P. L. 119;
Trickett, Liens, 41; 3 Liens, 39; Thomas
v. Hinkle, 125 Pa. 472; Hoff's Appeal,
102 Pa. 218, cited by counsel is under a
different act, under which the lien does
not begin till the claim is filed, and if
after the sale, work or material was done,
a lien therefor would attach, despite the
sale, unless the purchaser forbade the prosecution of the contract. Compton began
work 24 days after he made the contract.
Nothing indicates that he was apprised
of the conveyance to Mrs. King. He assumed, as he had a right to do, that he had
authority to proceed with the construction.
The house might therefore have been
charged with a lien notwithstanding that
it has become Mrs. King's.
f Gordon
v. Torrey, 15 N. J. Eq. 112.

Compton, for some reason, has not filed
and thus preserved his lien, but, instead,
has brought this assumpsit against Mrs.
King. We fail to see on what accepted
theory he can maintain it. The contract
though made in her presence, was not
made with her, but with her husband.
So Compton averred, when he sued William King before the magistrate. King
did not profess to contract for his wife,
who, at the time, was not the owner of the
premises. Her presence and silence, at
the making of the contract, can therefore
have no significance.
Are we to infer a personal assumption
from the mere non-resistance to the improvements? When A furnishes labor or
chattels to B, under circumstances which
show that he expects B to pay for them,
and B, though knowing that he is so
doing, acquiesces in his act, without informing him that he, B, will not pay for
them, B will be liable as on an implied
assumpsit. His conduct is equivalent to
an acceptance of the work or chattels, and
a promise to pay for them. But, what
evidence is there that Compton expected
Mrs. King to pay him? He thought he
was rendering his services to William King.
He therefore did not expect Mrs. King to
pay him. Mrs. King knew that lie had
contracted with her husband, and hence,
that he was expecting the latter, and not
herself to pay him. What element of
estoppel as a substitute for a contract then
exists? None. The contract with King
explains Compton's act, and not only does
that act not require us to attribute it to
an expectation of payment by Mrs. King,
but, coupled with the contract, forbids the
attribution of such an expectation.
If acquiescence, by the owner of a lot, in
the doing of work on it by sub-contractors
is to be construed into an assumpsit to pay
such sub-contractors, then such persons,
in every case, may not only file liens, but
may charge the owner personally. The
enunciation of such a doctrine would
indeed startle the people of the state. The
owner does not become personably liable
to the material-man, unless, as in Landis
v. Royer, 59 Pa. 95, he expressly promises
to pay. The material-man relies on the
personal liability of the contractor, and
upon the lien. No liability attaches to
the owner. The facts forbid the suspicion
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that Compton expected Mrs. King to pay
him. He took the promise of William
King. He sued William King. He had
also the power to file a lien. He did not
know that Rebecca had become the owner
of the house. He did not therefore imagine
that he had lost his right to the lien. Nor,
she knowing of the contract and of the
work done under it, had he in fact lost it.
What she is estopped by her silence from
doing, is denying the right to a lien, in
view of which, she was bound to suppose,
Compton did the work. Her silence has
not forged for her a personal contract.
Judgment reversed.

the insurance policy. The second section
of the act of June 8,1893, P. L. 344, provides that a married woman "may not become accommodation indorser, maker,
guarantor or surety for another." Under
this section of the act we are of the opinion
that Mrs. Mott is not liable on the note,
inasmuch as she joined in the execution
of it "as surety" for her husband. "The
liability sought to be enforced is a direct
contract of suretyship and upon such a
contract there is no liability, unless we
choose to set aside the positive terms of an
express statute, which, as a matter of
course we will not do"-Green, J., in Miltbank v. Tabler, 181 Pa. 108; vide Hooper v.
Tritt 3 Forum 85; Patrick v. Smith, 165
Pa. 526; Henry v. Bigley, 5 Sup. Ct. 503.
REBECCA MOTT vs. JOHN JOLLIS.
Can she however, insist upon Jollis refunding to her the $2100 realized on the
Femme Covert-Act of 1893 prohibiting
sale of the bonds and collection of the insurety by, does not prohibit actual desurance policy? Under the act of 1893,
livery of goods to insure payment of
supra,a married woman cannot become
note-Case stated-No appeal unless surety for the debt or another. Is the asright expressly reserved.
signment of the bonds and policy such an
act of suretyship as will bring it within
RYAN and LiGaTNER for plaintiff.
the purview of the statute? We think
RILEY and COIMiREY for defendant.
not. "To make herself personally liable
for another's debt would be for the wife to
STATEMENT OF TE
CASE.
become surety. She does not become
On 3d Jan., 1894, John Jollis lent $3000
surety when she makes some specific propto Sam. Mott, who, with his wife, Rebecca
erty liable for such debt."-Denniston v.
Mott, as surety, executed to Jollis a promisThompson, 2 Forum 154. The act, section
sory note for that amount, payable in one
one, provides that "a married woman shall
year. Jollis besides this note insisted on
have the same right and power as an unreceiving from Mrs. Mott, an assignment
married person to * * use, lease, sell or
of a policy for $1000 payable on the death
otherwise
dispose of any property, of any
of her husband to her, and likewise of two
kind, real, personal or mixed, either in
bonds of a corporation, each for $500. On
Aug. 17, 1898, Sam. Mott died and Jollis possession or expectancy, and may exercollected $1000 on the life policy. He also cise the said right in the same manner and
to the same extent as an unmarried persold the bonds, obtaining therefor $1100.
son * *." Under the earlier acts of 1848
Jollis contends that Rebecca still oweshim
and 1887 she was enabled to make transfers
on the note. She insists that the assignof her own property to her husband.
ments were void as well as the note and
that she should recover the $2100 and also Powell's Appeal, 98 Pa. 403; or to others:
Leiper's Appeal, 108 Pa. 381; Bond v.
be freed from the note. This case is stated
Bunting, 78 Pa. 210; or, as collateral to seto obtain a decision as to these respective
cure her husband's debt: Selden v. Bank,
contentions.
69 Pa. 424; Dando's Appeal, 94 Pa. 76:
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Souder v. Bank, 156 Pa. 374. Since the
This case is stated to determine (1) the passage of theact of 1893, a married woman
can mortgage her real estate to secure a
liability of Mrs. Mott on the note of Jan.
3, 1897, given by her husband, in which
debt of her husband: Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178
she joined as surety and (2) the liability
Pa. 303, Bank v. Kuntz, 175 Pa. 432. In
of Jollis to refund to her the $2100 realized
Kulp v. Brant, 162 Pa. 522 and Dusenberry
on the sale of the bonds and collection of
v. Insurance Co., 188 Pa. 454, it was held
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that the assignment of an insurance policy
by a wife to secure a debt of her husband,
was valid.
From this brief review of the authorities,
which could easily be multiplied in favor
of our conclusion, we are clearly of the
opinion that the assignment of the bonds
and policy by Mrs. Mott to John Jollis, to
secure the debt of her husband, was valid
in every respect and she cannot now secure the aid of the courts to repudiate it.
AUBREY, J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The judgment from which this appeal
is taken was entered upon a case stated in
which the parties did not reserve the right
to appeal. It follows that the appeal must
be quashed. Commonwealth v. Callahan,
153 Pa. 62.5.
That Rebecca Mott could not bind herself by a promise to pay, money or other
article, as surety for her husband, is put
beyond question by the explicit language
of the act of 1893. That act, however,
does not prevent the actual delivery by
her, of money or other chattels, for the
purpose of paying or securing thepayment
of his obligations. So she may assign
policies of life insurance, bonds and other
choses in action for this purpose. Kulp v.
Brant, 162 Pa. 222; Dusenberry v. Ins. Co.,
188 Pa. 454.
If she assigns these choses, not to secure
the performance of his promise, but of her
own, is the assignment valid? The case
stated is susceptible of the interpretation
that Airs. Mott assigned the policy, etc.,
to secure performance of her own promise.
If such was its purpose, was it invalid ?
After some reflection, we have concluded
that it was not. The non-enforceableness
of the promise would not make the performance of it revocable. A pledge to secure the execution of an illegal contract,
Ring v. Green, 6 -Allen, 139; Schouler,
Bailments, 185 ; 18 Am. and Eng. Encyc.
600; or of a contract now barred by limitation, Kulp v. Brant, 162 Pa. 222; Hartranft's Estate, 153 Pa. 530, is not for that
reason recoverable by the pledgeor. The
decision of the learned court below is
under every interpretation of the case
probably correct, but for the reason stated
supra, the appeal is quashed.

LUCINDA MORAN, et. at. vs. PHILIP
SHAW.
Duress-Presenceof a drunken and violent
father or husband constitutes.
MCCABE and DEAL for plaintiff.
ROTHERMEL and SHREVE for defendant.
STATEMENT OF 9lE CASE.

The father of Lucinda Moran, William
Stevens, died August 11, 1896, and bequeathed to her, $250, to her daughter
Sarah, $200, and to her son John, $200.
The three agreed to buy a piano, to be the
common property of all, in equal shares.
Sarah was twenty-two and John seventeen years old. In March, 1898, Patrick,
husband of Lucinda, and father of John
and Sarah, brought to the house Shaw and
showing him the piano, and asserting it
to be his, sold it for $500 to Shaw, who
paid the money at once and took the piano
away. Patrick was drunken, violent and
morose, the terror of his wife and children.
Though they were present when Shaw
bought the piano, they remained silent.
Three months afterwards, Patrick Moran
died. This action in trespass is then
brought, after demand on Shaw for the
piano, by the widow and children.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In the consideration of this case we
assume from the statement of facts before
us that the defendant was a purchaser for
value of the piano which is the subject of
controversy; that le relied upon the statement of the husband that the piano was
the husband's property; and that he was
innocent of all knowledge of the real
ownership.
There can be nothing clearer than that
the omission to assert ownership of one's
property while seeing another fraudulently
inveigled into its purchase and yielding
therefor a valuable consideration, will,
unless there exist peculiar relations between the parties, or unless there be other
circumstances extenuating in law, work
an estoppel against the subsequent assertion of the title by the true owner.
In the present case, however, one of the
persons it is sought to estop by the omission to make known her right to the piano
fraudulently sold as the property of
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another, is a feme covert; another is an
infant of but seventeen years. Are they
estopped from the assertion of their title
to the piano?
Looking first at the position of the wife,
it seems to be well settled that a married
woman cannot be estopped by any conduct of her's so as to pass her real estate to
another. She can alien her realty only in
the method sanctioned by the statute.
Stivers v. Tucker, 126 Pa. 74; Quins v.
Templeton, 95 Pa. 262. But how as regards personalty? May she estop herself
as to that? A plain dictum in the case
last cited recognizes this possibility. But
more distinctly is the doctrine recognized
in Grim's Appeal, 105 Pa. 375. "A married
woman," says the court, ' should be held
to the observance of that good faith in her
dealings with the world to which others
are bound. Hence, although contracts
void under the disability of coverture can
not be validated by estoppel, in matters as
to which she is affected with no disability
she will be held to the exercise of tne same
degree of good faith as are others in like
cases." This makes clear the distinction.
Because a married woman may, under our
statute, dispose of her personalty as fully
as if she were afeme sole, and because her
husband has no legal control over this
species of her property, the reason for the
suspension of the rule of estoppel in favor
of married women must disappear. In
Dann v. Cudney, 13 Mich. 239, it is held
that a married woman may estop herself
by her silence while her property is sold
by her husband as his own. (See also
.Wharton on Contracts, Sec. 89; Knight v.
Thayer, 125 MRass. 25; and XIV Am. and
Eng. Encyc. of Law, pages 643 and 645.)
In the last authority it is said that "as to
her personalty, if she stands by and allows
her husband to sell it, and the purchaser
relies on her silence, she is estopped from
afterward setting up her title."
Let us see how stands the infant plaintiff.
Without entering upon a lengthy discussion of this question, it seems to us, after
an examination of the authorities, that
the father, under the mere facts outlined
in the statement, had no legal right to sell
the piano of the son. Because he had no
such right, the son, unless estopped by his
silence, may recover damages for the detention of the piano. Although the

authorities are conflicting on the question
of whether an infant may estop himself
from asserting his title to property, we
believe it to be the law that mere silence,
unaggravated by fraud on the part of the
infant, will not work such an estoppel,
Wharton on Contracts, Sec. 74; McBeth
v. Frahney, 69 MNo. 642; X Am. and Eng.
Encyc. of Law, 671; 25 Cal. 147; 92 Ky.
500. The infant was under a legal disability. He himself could alien his property, but such sale would be revocable.
Had he really consented to the sale he
might recover damages for the detention
of the piano after avoidance of the contract. He received no consideration, consequently he could return none. No
wilful fraud being urged against the infant, and itnot having been shown,that
he was acquainted with his legal right at
the time of the sale, we believe that he
may maintain this action against the
defendant. More than the meagre facts
before the court must be shown in order
to justify us in submitting the question of
his estoppel to the jury.
It has been urged that the plaintiffs are
not estopped by their silence because undue influence was exercised over them by
the husband and father. Suppose that
were so. The duress was not practiced by
the defendant, nor does it appear that he
was collusively guilty. On the contrary he
could not have known of the undue influence, if there was any, because he was
innocent of all knowledge that the piano
was not the property of the husband. We
do not believe that the wrong of the husband can be visited upon him, an innocent
purchaser for value.
In Fairbanks v.
Snow, 145 Mass. 153, where the authorities
on the subject are reviewed, it is held that
"in an action by the payee against the
maker of a promissory note, it is no defense that the defendant, a married woman,
was induced to sign the note by threats
made to her by her husband, if the payee
took the note in ignorance thereof." (See
also Clark on Contracts, 373 and 363; Dent
v. Long, 90 Ala. 172; Sherman v. Sherman,
20 N. Y. Supp. 418; Compton v: Banks, 96
111. 301.) The case at bar, we think, is
governed by the authorities just cited, and
in our opinion the element of duress must
be eliminated from this case.
The infant son, therefore, not having
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estopped himself by his silence, may recover for the conversion of his interest in
the piano. The other parties, plaintiff
wife and adult daughter, are estopped from
asserting any title to the subject matter of
this suit, and must, therefore, fail in this
action for damages.
LEON C. PRINCE, P. J.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.

The able opinion of the learned court below clearly shows that the positions of the
three plaintiffs are different with respect
to the transaction out of which the action
has sprung. It will conduce to clearness
if, imitating it, we treat them separately.
The piano was the joint property of Lucinda, Sarah and John Moran. Patrick
Moran had no power to sell it, save such as
he might have as their agent. He did not
profess to sell as their agent, but, on the contrary, asserted that the piano was his own.
There is no evidence of agency. If Shaw
gained the ownership of the piano it can
have been only because the several owners
of it have been estopped by their conduct.
Was John Moran estopped? He was
silent when his father, averring his own
ownership, received the price from Shaw
and delivered to him the piano. Silence,
it is said, will estop, when one ought to
speak. This oughtis not alegal,but a moral,
a social ought; the courts create a legal
ought, out of the moral ought; out of the
requirement by the "principles of natural
justice," that one should disclose the fact.
11 Am. and Eng. Encyc. 428; Thompson
v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270. Ordinarily,
when A is present, at a sale by B to C, of a
chattel, as B's, which A knows to be his,
A is under a social duty to inform C that
the chattel is not B's, but his, A's. 11
Am. and Eng., 429 ; Thompson v. Blanchard, 4N. Y. 303, 309 ; Greenhoe v. College,
144 Pa. 131, which becomes a legal duty
by the court's depriving A of the right to
reclaim the chattel.
Is a minor under this moral, this social
duty? If he is, it is at all events true, as
the learned court has decided, that in his
case, the law does not impose on him a similar duty. Neglect of the moral duty does
not entail the legal consequences which
would flow, were it. likewise a legal duty.
Had John Moran professed to sell the
piano, the sale would have been nugatory,

had he chosen to repudiate it. Even had
he deceived Shaw into believing that he
was of age, when he was a minor, he
would have had the same power to annul
a sale made by himself. Keen v. Ifartman, 48 Pa. 497 ; Keen v. Coleman, 39 Pa.
299. If then an express deception, would
not make the contract procured by means
of it binding, it is difficult to understand
how an implicit deception arising from
negligent, or even studied silence, when
another is contracting for what is his
property could have the effect of divesting
his estate therein. 10 Am. and Eng.
Encyc. 671 ; Hughes v. Gallans, 10 Phila.
618. The trial court has properly held that
John Moran may recover.
Lucinda Moran was the wife of Patrick,
and her silence took place in the presence
of her husband. He asserted that the
piano was his, and, in her presence sold
it. Was she under amoral andsocial duty
to contradict him, and to commence an
altercation in the presence of a stranger?
The husband in fact exerts a kind of
ascendance over the wife, which, in the
sense of the law, diminishes her responsibility. A wrong committed by her, in his
presence, is so far presumed to have been
under his duress that she is not liable for
it. Cooley, Torts, 132; Franklin's Appeal,
115 Pa. 534; Wheeler v. Hell, 115 Pa. 487;
14 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 645. Keen v. Hartman and Keen v. Coleman, supra, show
that there are interests more precious to
the law than the repression of deceptions
by married women, by enforcing the contracts into which they beguile others.
"Very rarely if at all will her silence or
acts in the presence of her husband operate as an estoppel." Lahr's Appeal, 90
Pa. 507. "The wife," says Green, J.,
"being legally subject to the husband, and
under his control, is not the same free
agent as would be an independent third
person, and therefore would not be subject
to an inference from her-mere silence such
as would affect a third person. It can
hardly be considered that she would be
subject to a legal duty to contradict her
husband and practically declare him a
falsifier when making such an assertion
[that he owned a chattel which in fact
was her's] * * She is bound to render
him obedience and respect and to avoid
strife and contention." Paul v. Kunz, 188
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Pa. 504; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 27 N. J.
Eq. 502. The ordinary submissiveness of
a wife was probably enhanced in the case
of Mrs. Moran, for her husband was
"drunken, violent and morose, the terror
of his wife and children." It does not appear, it is true, that Philip Shaw knew
this, and it is well settled that a duress exerted by A on B, to make a contract with
C, will not relieve B from the bbligation
to C, if C had no knowledge of the duress.
Fairbanks v.Snow,145 Mass.153. Similarly
the fraud of A whereby B is induced to
contract with C, will not liberate B from
his duty to C, who was ignorant of the
fraud. Kulp v. Brant, 162 Pa. 222; Johnston v. Patterson, 114 Pa. 398. But the
nature of the usual relation of husband and
wife is well known, and Shaw must be
presumed to have understood that Mrs.
Moran would shrink from challenging the
husband's statement, in the presence of a
stranger. If it occurred to him that the
piano might be Mrs. Moran's, he could not
prudently infer that it was not, simply
because she did not, in his presence plumply contradict her husband and thwart his
negotiation. We are not prepared to hold
that she was called on, at the possible cost
of domestic peace, and in violence to her
wifely deference to her spouse, to dissipate
Shaw's tacit assumption that the piano
was Patrick Moran's. We are compelled
therefore to hold that Lucinda Moran was
entitled to recover.
Sarah Moran was but twenty-two years
of age, a daughter of Patrick, having been
brought up in his house and still living
with him. The respebt, fear, and submission of a daughter must be even more profound than those of a wife. We are unaole to say that Sarah's silence, precludes
her from now alleging that the piano was
her's. Shaw could not prudently or naturally have drawn any inference from it.
She was not bound to correct the tacit assumption on which he was acting, at the
expense of the possible rage and displeasure
of her father. Her silence was unstudied.
It was neither fraudulent nor negligent.
It has its explanation in entirely honorable
feelings whose existence and effects Shaw
ought to have suspected.
The judgment of the trial court will be
modified, and judgment entered for all the
plaintiffs for the sum of $600.

JACOB HARPER vs. ELECTRIC
RAILWAY COMPANY.
Mutilated paper currency-Three-fifths or
mnore of a note must be accepted at
full value.
STATEMENT OF TIE CASE.

Harper, a passenger of the defendant
company, offered to the conductor a one
dollar legal tender note in payment of his
fare. A piece two inches long and threefourths of an inch wide had. been torn
from the upper left-hand corner of the bill.
The conductor declined to receive thenote
and, Harper refusing to leave the car,
ejected him from it.
It is agreed that $100 would be a reasonable sum for damages if Harper is entitled
to recover.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Harper, a passenger on the defendant
company's car offered to the conductor a
one dollar legal tender note in payment of
his fare. A piece two inches long and
three-fourths of an inch wide had been
torn from the upper left-hand corner of
the bill. The conductor declined to receive the note and, Harper refusing to
leave the car, ejected him from it. This
action is to determine whether, upon the
facts as stated, as a matter of law, Harper
is entitled to damages; the amount of the
same being $100 if entitled to recover.
The Electric Railroad Company is a common carrier, and as such, is bound to carry
all such persons as conform to the rules
and regulations which the company has
promulgated for the guidance of its servants. The law of this State is so well
settled that we need not quote authorities
for the statement that the company is responsible in damages to any person who
has been injured or damaged in any way
by the wrongful act of its servant while
acting within the scope of his employment. It is also well settled that if a passenger declines to pay his fare, on proper
demand, when on a railroad or railvay
car, or other vehicle of a common carrier,
he may be ejected.
Harper wasapassenger on the car of the
defendant company and was ejected by
one of the company's servants while act-
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ing within the scope of his employment.
If there was a breach of duty on the part
of defendant company, if it was the duty
of the conductor to accept the dollar bill
offered by Harper as payment of his fare,
then the plaintiff is entitled to our decision
in this case, but if he was justified in refusing to accept the money then the decision must be in favor of the defendant.
In deciding whether the defendant was
justified in refusing to accept the money
tendered we must consider two questions,
(1) was the amount tendered reasonable?
(2) was it the conductor's duty to accept
the mutilated bill and give the plaintiff
the necessary change?
In answer to the first inquiry we would
say that we think it not unreasonable to
require the conductor to take from a one
dollar bill a fare of five cents. In Baker
v. Central Park R. R. Co., 151 N. Y. 237,
the company had a rule which required
their conductors to accept and give change
for any amount not exceeding two dollars.
This rule was upheld by the Court of Errors and Appeals, which said it would be
unreasonable and burdensome to extend
the amount to five dollars. They also said
that it was not necessary that a common
carrier should bring home to each passenger a personal knowledge of any reasonable and just rule which it is seeking to enforce, to so hold would render the enforcement of the rule impracticable.
The Supreme Court of California has decided that a tender of five dollars was a
reasonable tender. While in 2 Forum 9,
the iearned Court held that ten dollars was
an unreasonable tender.
Whether a rule of the company forbidding the conductors to give change for a
sum greater than a dollar, would be upheld by the Courts as reasonable, is unnecessary to the decision of this case, since
we do not have any evidence of the existence of such rule, and in the absence of
such rule we do not hesitate to say that
the value of the piece of money tendered
was not so much in excess of the fare that
it would be unreasonable to expect the
conductor to be able and willing to accept
the same and give the passenger the necessary change.
But, in answer to the second proposition, can we say that the conductor was
under a duty to accept the torn bill. The

case Jersey City and Bergen R. R. Co. v.
Morgan, 52 N. J. L., 60, relied upon by
the able counsel for the plaintiff, does not,
in our opinion, decide the case for the
plaintiff. In the above case the plaintiff
offered to the conductor, in payment of
his fare, a ten cent piece which had been
worn smooth, the conductor refused to accept the same. Upon demandand refusal
to pay fare the plaintiff was ejected from
the car. The plaintiff was permitted to recover damages because the coin was not so
worn that it was light or indistinguishable as a genuine coin, nor was it defaced,
cut or mutilated, but only made smooth
by constant and long-continued handling
while being circulated as part of the national currency.
The Court in its charge to the jury said:
"If there has been no other abrasure, no
other wearing away, no other defacement
of that coin, except such as it has received
in passing from hand to hand, then it is
still, under thelaws of the country, a good
ten-cent piece, and was the fare of the
plaintiff. If you think it has been otherwise changed, willfully changed, by being
rubbed or in any other way, then it has
ceased to be a lawful coin of the country.
It has ceased to belawfultender." If the
same rules apply to legal tender notes, we
think the plaintiff's case must fall, and we
see no reason why the mutilation of a legal
tender note would not destroy its value as
lawful money, just the same as the mutilation of a coin destroys its value. The
bill in question has been mutilated, the
missing part was tornfrom the part offered
to the conductor, and not worn by being
passed from hand to hand as part of the
currency of the United States.
The rules regulating the redemption of
all other than national bank notes as given
by Seymour Eaton in his work on banking provides that one-tenth of the value
of the bill is to be deducted for each tenth
or fraction thereof missing, unless the
note is clearly less than one-half, when it
is not redeemable. As the note in question in this case was other than a national
bank note, the value of said note would be
determined by ascertaining what proportional part of the note was missing. If
one-tenth was missing then deduct onetenth from the face value of note; if a little
more than one-tenth then two-tenths must
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be deducted from the face value of note.
We do not think it was the duty of the
conductor in this ease to calculate the
amount of the note destroyed, and thus
ascertained the amount of change the
passenger was entitled to. The plaintiff
is not entitled to damages. The judgment of the Court is entered accordingly.
J. G. MILLER, J.
CONCURRING OPINION.

Harper was a passenger on defendant
company's road, and offered in payment
of his fare a one dollar legal tender note
from which a piece two inches long and
th ree-fourths of an inch wide had been torn.
The conductor declined to receive this, and
Harper, refusing to leave the car, was
ejected by the conductor, for which he
brings this suit.
It is well settled that if a passenger declines to pay his fare on proper demand
when on any vehicle of a common carrier,
he becomes a trespasser and may be ejected.
The carrier is not compelled to complete
the transportation and sue him for the fare.
Buchannan v. Shamokin Railway Co., 2
Forum 9; Dietrich v. Penna. R. R. Co., 71
Pa. 432. Therefore if this tender of the
mutilated bill was not a good tender, Harper was justly ejected from the car and
can have no cause of action.
It does not appear that this bill was the
only-money he had. If he had any other
he can have no excuse for insisting on the
conductor's accepting this. It is fair to
assume that his insistence on this particular bill was out of pure wantonness and
perverseness.
There seems to be a paucity of decisions
on questions of this nature. The counsel
have referred us to but a few, and these are
relative to silver coin. The plaintiff has
laid great stress on the Jersey City, etc., R.
R. Co. v. Morgan, 52 N. J. L. 60,160 U. S.
288. In that case a genuine and recognizable coin of the United States, worn only
by natural abrasion, not appreciably diminished in weight and retaining the appearance of a coin duly issued from the
mint, was held to be a good tender. It
should be noticed that this coin was not
defaced, cut, or mutilated, but only made
smooth by constant and continued handling, while being circulated as part of the
national currency. The Court expressly

charged that if it had been otherwise
changed, wilfully changed, it had ceased
to be a coin of the country, and ceased to
be a lawful tender. Had it been mutilated
in any way the verdict would have been
for the defendant.
The note that Harper presented in payment of his fare was clearly mutilated, and
we think the conductor was right in refusing to accept it. J. Marcy in speaking
of mutilated bank bills in Hinsdale.v. The
Bank of Orange, 6 Wend. 378, says: "That
half of a bill by itself, and wholly separated
from the other, is not negotiable, is as clear
to my mind as the proposition is that a
part is not equal to the whole. When a
bill ceases to exist as a whole, it ceases to
have those properties which belong to it as
an entirety, one of which is negotiability."
To the same effect see Bank of U. S. v.
Sill, 5 Conn. 106, Northern Bank v.
Farmers' Bank, 57 Ky. 506.
It is not the intention of the government
that mutilated currency should continue
in circulation. The act of June 30th, 1864,
provides that the Secretary of the Treasury
shall make such regulations for the redemption of mutilated notesas may appear
to him expedient. In former times such
currency was only redeemable in the proportion which the mutilated part bore to
the whole note. Now it is provided that
as long as three-fifths of the original note
remains, it is redeemable at its face value.
Had the conductor accepted this mutilated note it would have relieved the
plaintiff from the burden of having it redeemed and put the onus of it on the defendant, and so in fact decreased the fare
for his transportation. For these reasons
we think it was not a good tender.
Judgment for defendant.
W. B. FREED, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

As the ejection of a passenger from a car
is prima facie a trespass, it is incumbent
on the defendant to prove the justificatory
facts. The common carrier may expel a
passenger,who, when his fare is demanded,
refuses to pay it. The tender must be of
that which the law declares alegal tender.
Harper tendered a one dollar note of the
United States. The conductor had no right
to refuse it, on the ground that it was for
too large a sum. He might reasonably be
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expected to make tie change. Buchanan
v. Shamokin Railway Co., 2 Forum 9. The
only objection made to the note was the
imperfectness of its condition. Mutilation
would be immaterial, if it did not affect the
circulability of the note, and this circulability depends on the law of congress.
The 3574th section of the Revised Statutes,
act March 3rd, 1863, requires the Secretary
of the Treasury to make "regulations for
redemption of such notes, when mutilated
or defaced." On December 1st, 1897, an
order was issued by the Treasurer, with the
approval of the Secretary, to the effect (1)
that United States notes "are redeemable
by the Treasurer, and when not mutilated
so that less than three-fifths of the original
proportions remains, by the several assistant treasurers, at face value;" (2) that
such notes, "when mutilated so that less
than three-fifths, but clearly more than
two-fifths of the original proportions remains, are redeemable by the Treasurer
only, at one-half the face value;" and (3)
that "fragments less than three-fifths are
redeemed at the face value of the whole
note when accompanied by an affidavit
* * that the missing portions have been
totally destroyed."
It is thus seen that perfect notes and
fragments containing three-fifths of the
original dimensions and more, are treated
by the United States precisely in the same
way. They are both redeemable, at par,
and by the same officers. Being"redeemable" in coin, and being a legal tender are
not it is true the same thing. But, as the
Statute declared notes of the United States
a legal tender, the fact that such notes,
when complete and when so imperfect that
three-fifths of them still remain, are indistinguishably redeemed, indicates the sense
of the treasury officials, that they have the
same value as legal tender. The act of
congress does not say that the legal tender property shall depart from a note when
it loses one-twentieth, or one-fifteenth or
one-tenth of its dimension by accidental or
deliberate mutilation. It would be impossible to hold that the loss of any part,
however minute, of a note would take from
it its money property, yet, mutilation may
be so serious as to produce this result. It
is convenient to adopt the rule of the
treasury department as the test. A con-

plete note and any portion of it not less
than three-fifths of the whole must be regarded as a legal tender.
A United States note is about seven
inches long and three inches wide and
contains, therefore, about twenty-one
square inches. The fragment lost was two
inches long and three quarters of an inch
wide, and contained one square inch and
a half. Its size was one-fourteenth of the
entire note. We think the note was as
fully a legal tender as the perfect note
would have been.
When the lost part is so nearly two-fifths,
that careful measurement would be necessary to determine whether it was not fully
two-fifths, it might be that the conductor
would not be compelled to make the
measurement in order to justify his refusal
of the note. Jersey City Railroad Co. v.
Morgan, 52 N. J. 60, seems, however, to
put on him the task of deciding whether
a coin offered him, has lost weight by
fraud, or by incidental wear, and retains
the appearance of a genuine coin. The
note offered the conductor was so clearly
above three-fifths of what it was in the
perfect state, that he was bound to know
that fact. He was also bound to know
that the law of congress had made it a
legal tender. It follows that in putting
the passenger off the car, he committed a
trespass, for which the passenger should
recover damages. 52 N. J. L. 60; 2 Forum 9.
Judgment reversed.
IN RE ASSIGNED ESTATE OF C. C.
LOOSE.
Attorney's fees-Not chargeable on assigned estate for securing judgment
after assignment.
STATEM1ENT OF FAMrS.

C. C. Loose made an assignment September 23, 1898, for benefit of creditors to
W. J. Carlin. About five days after the
date of the assignment judgments were
entered of record against C. C. Loose in
the sum of about $15,000. The real estate,
etc., has all been converted into money.
The estate is insolvent.
The auditor, appointed to distribute the
fund, has held that the costs on the judgments cannot be paid, nor interest on. any
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debts after the date of the assignment.
He has allowed a dividend on five per
-cent. attorney's commissions, embraced in
some of the judgments. Exceptions.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
When C. C. Loose, on the 23rd day of
September, 1898, made an assignment for
the benefit of his creditors, he divested
himself of all legal interest in the assigned
estate and so much of the equitable ownership as was co-extensive in value with the
claims of the creditors. Weinmann &
Co.'s Est., 164 Pa. 405. Being insolvent,
the debts exceeded in amount the value of
the assigned estate, and the assignor's
ownership of the estate, legal and equitable, may in this case be said to have been
wholly divested by the deed to Carlin.
Before the entry of the notes they were
simple contracts to pay a certain sum of
money, and while, if Loose had not assigned prior to entry, that act would have
acquired for them a lien upon the real
estate of Loose, yet, as it was, at the date
of the assignment they were common
claims against Loose, and, as such, similar
in all respects to the other unsecured demands against him. "Their (tihe creditors) rights are fixed as of the date of the
assignment, and their ownership of the
property is in the proportion that their respective debts bear to the whole indebtedness." Weinmann & Co.'s Est., 164 Pa.
405. It will follow from this view that
the costs of recording the judgments can
not be placed upon the estate, for that
would disturb the relations of the equitable
owners which were fixed by the assignment.
The same principle must decide the
question as to whether interest on these
claims shall be allowed to the date of the
assignment or some later date. This very
point was decided in Jamison's Appeal, 163
Pa. 143; when the creditors were denied
interest beyond the date of the assignment.
The attorney's commission of five per
cent. must be charged on the fund if it
was a debt of the estate at the time of the
assignment. That it was so, is apparent
upon slight reflection. The only limitation which the courts have seen fit to
place upon the power of the parties to
make such a stipulation is, that it must
be reasonable and not oppressive to the
debtor.

The question to be determined, is whether or not this was a debt of the estate at
the time of the assignment. Let us look
at the nature of the agreement. It is an
agreement to pay five per cent. for the expense of collecting the debt if an attorney's
services become necessary. What determines whether or not the necessity for the
employment of an attorney is present?
We know of no test which will apply to
all cases
In Moore's App., 110 Pa. 433, the court
disallowed an attorney's commission
which had been stipulated for "when defendant did not dispute the claim and
offered to pay it at maturity." But in
that case there had been no assignment
and the party was solvent. The circumstances of the case before us are too dissimilar for the application of the same rule,
i. e., demand and refusal. When Loose
became insolvent and made an assignment
for the benefit of his creditors, his affairs
were in such a condition that it cannot
reasonably be said that a demand at the
time of assignment would have availd
anything, and must have been met with
an express or tacit declination to pay,
and the services of an attorney were reasonably necessary. Considering the great
refinement which the law of assignment
has attained and the habit of our people
in intrusting their affairs to a person especially skilled in the law when their
rights are actually or apparently in danger, will it be contended that the necessity
provided for in the agreement in question
did not arrive with the time for the assignment? We think not. We venture to
say that no prudent layman would himself undertake to follow his claims through
the windings in the settlement of an assigned estate, and trust to his own skill
and knowledge to see that his rights were
properly respected. The law would not
require him to do so. The necessity for
an attorney's services arose when the assignment was made. Simultaneously
with the assignment, it became a debt of
the estate, and its recognition as a valid
claim does not violate the doctrine that
the debts become fixed as of the time of
the assignment. It is therefore entitled
to participate in the distribution of the
proceeds of the estate.
CHAS. M. MEANS, J.
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C. C. Loose, an insolvent, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. His
real estate, etc., has all been converted
into money.
After the date of assignment (about five
days) judgments were entered of record
against C. C. Loose in the sum of $15,000.
W. J. Carlin, Esq., was appointed assignee of the insolvent estate.
The rights of creditors of an insolvent
become fixed by a decree of the Court
ordering the dissolution thereof. Norights
can be subsequently acquired by a creditor
which.will entitle him to a larger partition
in the assets of such an insolvent estate.
Dean and Son's Appeal, 98 Pa. 101.
The question then resolves itself into
this-was the assignment made on date of
entry or subsequent? We infer from the
statement of facts that they were made
subsequent, and not on the date of entry.
Under these conditions the assignee of the
insolvent estate cannot be held liable for
the costs of entry of said judgment, and
that they must be paid by the parties who
entered the same. On the other hand if
we were to infer that the assignment was
made on the date of entry, i. e., Sept. 23,
1898, then it is most certain that the assignee would be held liable for the said
costs. Such costs, as they are considered
in this case, are never paid by the assignee,
but by the parties who made the entry of
the same.
Creditors become equitable owners of
an insolvent estate in the proportion of
their debts at the time of the assignment.
Jamison's Appeal, 163 Pa. 143. Lawful interest shall be allowed to the creditor for
the sum or value he obtained judgment
for from the time the said judgment was
obtained until the time of sale or until the
satisfaction of the debt. Pepper and Lewis'
Digest p. 2,465. In other words where
there is a sale by an assignee for the benefit of creditors, interest on the liens does
not cease until the final confirmation of
The sale by the Court. Act of February
17th, 1876. This act fully settles the point
as regards real estate encumbered by
liens: The date of the confirmation
of the sale is the day when the land is converted into money. The liens thus discharged must be then paid according to
their priority on that day. Interest on
the liens thus discharged ceases on the day

of the final confirmation of the sale.
Tomlinson's Appeal, 90 Pa. 224.
The attorney's commission of five per
cent. is not included in the plaintiff's
claim, as was the case in Miller v. Miller,
147 Pa. 548. In this case at hand the
commission is not included in the judgment, and as a result the attorney's commission of five per cent. must be likewise
refused. Mahoming County, Bank's Appeal, 32 Pa. 158.
Since we, therefore, consider the assignment as subsequent we must agree that
the assignee is not liable for any debts
herein claimed, and the attorney's commission of five per cent. must be refused
and stricken off.
CHAS. H. MEYERS, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

The assignment is made for the payment
of existing debts. Although the recovery
of a judgment, after the assignment, for a
debt existing before it, may be of value, in
establishing the claim, in a distribution
proceeding, Pittsburg, etc., R. R.'s Appeal,
2 Gr. 151, the costs of this advantage, cannot be regarded as a debt existing at the
date of the assignment. Nor does the fact
that at this date, the creditor had the right
to create these costs and impose them as a
debt on the assignor, make them existing
debts. Cf. Weinmann's Estate, 164 Pa.
405; Dean's Appeal, 98 Pa. 101. Interest
on a debt accrues after the assignment as
well as before; but, when the estate is insolvent, that which accrues after is not
allowed to participate in it, although it
has been embraced in ajudgment recovered
since the assignment. Jamison's Estate,
163 Pa. 143. Neither will costs accruing
on such a judgment. The learned court
below properly dismissed the first exception.
What we have said shows that the second
exception was also without foundation,
Jamison's Estate, supra. Interest is to be
computed to the day of the assignment.
The sums thus ascertained are added to
the principals. The amounts so obtained
represent the ratios in which the creditors
are to take the fund. Allowing interest
subsequently would change these ratios.
There remains the question of commissions. The auditor has allowed cominissions of five per cent upon several of the
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claims, ranging from $500 to $2500. The
judges of the common pleas being divided
in opinion a.q to the propriety,of this allowance, the report of the auditor has been
confirmed. We are not able to reach the
same conclusion. The commissions are
allowed for the services of an attorney.
When the assignment was made, so far as
appears, no attorney had been employed.
It is indeed not clear that any of these
debts with commissions had then matured.
If they had not., no commissions were then
payable. After the assignment, the creditor might or might not employ an attorney. Sometimes the assignee attends to
the presentation of claims before the auditor. He may even make a distribution
without the intervention of an auditor.
An auditor has in fact been appointed, but
it does not expressly appear whether the
creditors urged their claims in propria
persona, or by attorney. In certain con-

tingencies, the employment of a lawyer to
recover a dividend from an assigned estate
is highly expedient, and even necessary.
But, the facts necessitating such employment and the employment itself are contingent until a time posterior to the assignment. For the reason for which costs on
later judgments, or interest on debts is
not payable from the insolvent fund, however expedient it may have been to obtain
these judgments, and however sure it was
that the interest would accrue between the
date of the assignment and that of the distribution, we think that attorney's commissions, not earned when the assignment
is made, must be excluded from participation in the fund. As the creditor must
look, for the collection of his interest, or
the costs of a judgment to other sources,
so must he, for the recovery of compensation for the employment of an attorney.
Decree reversed with procedendo.

